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The "Magic Words" of § 554:




Imagine that you want to participate in a pending decision by a
federal agency. You might be applying for a permit necessary to run your
business, such as a wastewater discharge permit' or seeking authorization
to start a new business in a regulated industry, such as banking You
might be challenging a penalty assessed against you for failing to
adequately maintain a nursing home3 or contesting the denial of
favorable loan conditions to your family farm. Alternatively, you might
be part of a citizen's group seeking to challenge the authorization of a
permit or license, such as a license to operate a nuclear power plant in
your neighborhood.5
Imagine that in each of these situations, the relevant statute required
the agency to hold a hearing before making its decision, but the statute
doesn't define any procedures to be used at that hearing. What
procedures should apply? As the one challenging an agency decision, you
would want a formal, trial-like hearing where you can present your case
* J.D., University of California. Hastings College of the Law, 20o5; B.S., University of
California, Santa Cruz. I would like to thank Adriana Dydell, Rachael Keast, and Christopher Tarbell
for their helpful comments. Special thanks as well to Dana Goldstein and Suzanne Roberts.
i. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977) (evaluating proceedings for a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit).
2. Indep. Bankers Ass'n of Ga. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 12o6
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (reviewing an order by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve authorizing a
new mortgage banking subsidiary).
3. Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. Thompson, 373 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2004).
4. Lane v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 12o F.3d io6 (8th Cir. 1997).
5. Union of Concerned Scientists v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (evaluating challenge by citizen's group to licensing of a nuclear power plant).
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before an impartial decisionmaker. You would want the opportunity to
present evidence favoring your position, call your own witnesses, and
cross-examine any opposing witnesses.
While those formal procedures could be part of the hearing, the
agency's interpretation is that none of those procedures are required.
The agency's interpretation is that the hearing required by the statute
can be satisfied by written submissions to an agency employee who will
make the decision. The procedures for the hearing need only satisfy
constitutional due process,6 and in this particular case, those written
submissions are sufficient.
Imagine further that you sue the agency, not over the substance of
the agency's decision, but instead challenging the procedures used to
arrive at that decision. Your argument is that formal, trial-like
procedures should have applied to the hearing. How should a court rule?
Whether or not a party to a federal agency adjudication has the
opportunity to a formal, trial-like hearing depends upon whether or not
§ 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)7 applies to that
adjudication. When § 554 applies, the agency hearing must follow formal,
trial-like procedures. When § 554 does not apply, then the hearing is
informal, and must only satisfy constitutional due process, as well as any
procedures required by the relevant statute. While the hypothetical
statute above did not define any procedures to be used at the hearing,
many statutes do include some procedural requirements.
The language of § 554 states that it applies to adjudications "to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 8
When this "hearing on the record" requirement is present, formal
procedures are required.' But when these "magic words"" are not in the
authorizing statute, and instead the statute calls only for a hearing,
without any "on the record" language, § 554 may still apply.
Whether or not a hearing alone can trigger § 554 has been addressed
by several of the United States courts of appeals, with differing results.
These results have further changed over the years as jurisprudential
approaches to statutory interpretation have evolved. The longstanding,
6. Constitutional due process is generally analyzed through the Supreme Court's three-part
balancing test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
7. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (2000).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2oo-).
9. Section 554 includes several formal, trial-like procedures, and also triggers the application of
§§ 556 and 557, which include additional formal requirements. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554,556-557.
IO. Various courts have referred to the "on the record" language as magical or talismanic
language that triggers the application of formal procedures. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 735 F.2d 1437, 1444 n.i2 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("magic words"); City of W.
Chicago v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 701 F.2d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 1983) ("magic words");
Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.zd 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 1977) ("the magical phrase 'on the record"');
id. at 8264 ("talismanic language").
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but still applicable, case law can be divided into two approaches. The
majority approach, taken by the First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits," is
for the courts to make a de novo evaluation of whether congressional
intent indicates that the adjudicatory hearing should be held using formal
procedures. 2 At times, these courts have indicated a presumption for
formal proceedings, but it is unclear whether that presumption is still
applied. The other approach, taken by the D.C. Circuit in Chemical
Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA,'3 applied the Chevron4 analysis, with its
preference for deferential review of agency interpretations. In that case,
the EPA interpreted hearing in one part of the statute as requiring
formal proceedings, while hearing in another part did not.'" After finding
that the statutory language was ambiguous, the court upheld the
Agency's interpretations of the statute as reasonable.' 6 The conflict in
approaches, between the majority de novo approach, and the D.C.
Circuit's deferential approach, has remained in place for fifteen years,
and neither approach has been explicitly overruled.
In 200I, after a series of cases touching on the subject of when
Chevron deference is appropriate," the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Mead Corp.'8 In Mead, the Court laid out a framework to
determine whether an agency decision should be given Chevron
deference, Skidmore'9 deference (a lesser degree of deference), or no
deference at all." Chevron deference is only appropriate where Congress
delegated the power to interpret the statute with the force of law to the
agency.' The principal factor used to find this delegation of power is the
level of formality required for the agency action; the more formal, the
more likely Chevron deference is appropriate.22 The Mead Court noted
that Chevron deference was frequently appropriate when the agency
interpretation was arrived at through formal adjudication. 3 Where
Chevron deference is not appropriate, the agency may still receive
Skidmore deference. Skidmore deference is based on a number of
ii. Cases from other circuits have also taken this approach, but examples from the First, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits are discussed at length.
12. See infra Part I.B.
13. 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
14. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
15. Chem. Waste Mgmt., 873 F.2d at 1479.
16. Id. at 1478.
17. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (i999); United States v. Haggar
Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (I999).
18. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
19. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
20. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227-30.
21. See id.




factors, 4 which look to the overall persuasiveness of the agency's
interpretation.
Mead overrules the D.C. Circuit's Chemical Waste Management
decision. Chemical Waste Management gave the agency Chevron
deference in order to determine whether it uses formal or informal
adjudication procedures. 5 Mead indicates that the agency should receive
Chevron deference where it used formal adjudication procedures to
make its decision. 6 While procedurally impossible, the implication of
following both of these decisions would be to give the agency deference
to decide whether it should get deference. 7
However, Mead does more than just overrule the Chemical Waste
Management approach. It establishes a new test to apply when a court is
analyzing whether formal or informal adjudication is required. When a
statute calls for a hearing on the record, it is obvious that formal
adjudication is required. But where the statute calls only for a hearing,
Mead charts a course between the Chevron deference approach of the
D.C. Circuit and the de novo analysis used by most circuits. The court
should apply Skidmore deference, and analyze the agency's
interpretation of whether formal adjudication is required. If the agency's
interpretation is persuasive under Skidmore, then the court should give
that interpretation appropriate deference. If the agency's interpretation
fails to receive deference under Skidmore, only then should the court
engage in a de novo analysis of congressional intent. The conclusion of
this Note is that Mead supercedes both current approaches, instead
requiring this intermediate approach under which Skidmore deference is
appropriate.
Part I of this Note reviews the background of this issue, divided into
three parts. Part L.A summarizes the case law addressing when formal
procedures are required in rulemaking under the APA. Formal
rulemaking, like formal adjudication, is triggered by the "on the record"
language, and provides for most of the same formal procedures. But in
the rulemaking context, the Supreme Court has clearly spoken as to
when formal or informal procedures are required. Part I.B reviews the
cases addressing whether the requirement of a hearing alone may trigger
formal adjudication. This Part includes a discussion of both the majority
de novo approach, and the D.C. Circuit's deferential approach. Part LC
looks at Mead, and lays out the Supreme Court's current test for
determining what level of deference to afford an agency interpretation.
Part II.A applies the Mead analysis to the issue of whether an agency
24. See infra text accompanying notes 188-91.
25. 873 F.2d 1477, 148o-8i (D.C. Cir. 1989).
26. See id.
27. It was this circularity or inconsistency that initially led to my interest in this topic.
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should be given Chevron deference to decide whether a hearing triggers
formal adjudication. This Note concludes that Chevron deference is not
appropriate in this context. However, the agency should still receive
Skidmore deference, a lesser degree of deference which is subject to a
number of factors. This Part also lays out the appropriate test for a court
to apply in evaluating whether a hearing may require formal
adjudication. Part II.B applies that test, and the Skidmore factors, to the
facts of Chemical Waste Management, and Union of Concerned Scientists
v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,2 an earlier decision by the D.C.
Circuit on this same issue, but which followed the majority approach and
did not afford the agency any deference. In both of these cases, this Note
concludes that the results reached were correct. In Chemical Waste
Management, the agency's interpretation should have been afforded
substantial deference under Skidmore. The court was correct to defer to
the agency's interpretation because of the reasonableness and
persuasiveness of the agency's procedural regulations at issue in that
case. However, in Union of Concerned Scientists, the Skidmore factors
indicate that the agency's interpretation should not have received any
deference, and the court was correct to engage in a de novo analysis of
whether formal adjudication was required. Courts facing the question of
whether a hearing requires formal or informal adjudication should look
to Skidmore to determine whether or not the agency's interpretation
should be given deference, and only if the court finds that deference is
inappropriate should it engage in a de novo analysis.
I. BACKGROUND
The APA29 governs the procedural steps required when an
administrative agency acts. The APA itself does not authorize agency
action. Instead, when another statute grants a federal agency the power
to take some action, the APA provides the procedural requirements that
an agency must meet in taking that action. For example, the EPA is
authorized under the Clean Water Act to issue wastewater discharge
permits3" and to promulgate various regulations governing pollutants.'
While the Clean Water Act describes the substantive legal and factual
considerations that should go into those actions, the APA provides the
minimum procedural requirements that must be met before the permits
can be issued or the regulations finalized.
Agency actions are classified as either rulemaking or adjudication.
28. 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 500-596 (2ooo).
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2000) (authorizing the Administrator to issue a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permit allowing discharges of wastewater into navigable waterways).
3 1. § t342(f)-(g) (authorizing promulgation of regulations governing point source discharges and
"[o]ther regulations for safe transportation, handling, carriage, storage, and stowage of pollutants").
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"Rule making" is the "process for formulating, amending, or repealing a
rule,"32 and a "rule" is "an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or
practice requirements of an agency."" Rules are generally prospective,
focused on policy, and more legislative than judicial in nature.
Regulations issued by an agency are a typical example of rulemaking.
An "adjudication" is the process by which an agency formulates an
order.'4 An order is defined in the negative, as any part of a final decision
by an agency "in a matter other than rule making."35 Any agency action
that involves a final decision, other than rulemaking, therefore falls
within the definition of an adjudication. Decisions by agencies to grant or
deny a permit or license, to assess penalties for noncompliance with
statutes or regulations, or even to hire or fire personnel are all
adjudications.
Each type of action can then be categorized as formal or informal,
depending on the procedures required by the APA. Rulemaking is either
formal or informal depending upon whether the statute authorizing
agency action requires that the rule "be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing." 6 If a hearing on the record is
required, then §§ 556 and 557 of the APA apply. These two sections
provide for a number of trial-like formal procedures, such as requiring
that the presiding decisionmaker be impartial, entitling the parties to
present evidence to that decisionmaker, to rebut evidence by the
opposing side, and to conduct cross-examination if necessary.37 If §§ 556
and 557 do not apply, then the rulemaking falls under the informal (or at
least less formal) procedural requirements of § 553, also known as
"notice-and-comment" rulemaking. Section 553 requires that the agency
issue notice of the proposed rulemaking and "give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking" through comments." The
agency must consider any relevant comments, and address them in a
32. § 551(5). While the APA uses the term "rule making," courts and commentators generally
eliminate the space and write "rulemaking." I have followed the latter convention here, except where
quoting language that includes the space.
33. § 551(4).
34. § 551(7).
35. § 55 1(6)_
36. § 553(c) ("When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.").
37. See § 556(b) (requiring presiding employees to conduct their functions "in an impartial
manner"); § 5 5 6(d) (allowing for receipt of evidence, entitling parties to present their case by "oral or
documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be
required for a full and true disclosure of the facts"); § 557(c) (requiring that the agency decision be




"concise general statement" included with the rule.39
The distinction between formal and informal adjudication is also
dependant upon whether the statute requires that the hearing be on the
record.4' When the action taken is an adjudication, and a hearing on the
record is required by statute, § 554, as well as §§ 556 and 557, apply to
the adjudication.4' Sections 556 and 557 require the same procedural
requirements discussed above,' and § 554 also requires that the parties
be given notice, an opportunity to submit facts and arguments in their
favor, and other trial-like procedures.43
In addition to the benefit of these formal, trial-like procedures, if
§ 554 of the APA does apply to the adjudication, parties successfully
challenging an agency decision may be able to recover attorney's fees.
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, a prevailing party (other than the
United States) in an adversarial adjudication before an agency can
recover attorney's fees and costs, unless the agency's position was
substantially justified.44 An adversarial adjudication is defined as, inter
alia, an adjudication under § 554 .4"
However, where formal adjudication is not required, the APA is
largely silent.46 This is unlike informal rulemaking, where there are APA-
imposed procedural requirements. As a result, unless specific procedures
are required by the relevant statute, informal adjudication is generally
only subject to the minimum procedures required to meet the due
process limitations imposed by the Fifth Amendment.47
In conclusion, where a statute authorizes agency action, either
rulemaking or adjudication, and that action must be "on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing," it is clear that the APA's formal,
trial-like procedures apply. But where the statute only requires a hearing,
can formal procedures still be required?
A. FORMAL OR INFORMAL RULEMAKING
In the context of rulemaking, the Supreme Court addressed this
question, and concluded that unless the statute includes the express
language "on the record," or "other statutory language having the same
39. § 553(c).
40. § 554(a) ("This section applies . in every case of adjudication required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.
41. See id.; see also § 553(c). The applicability of § 554 is subject to several exceptions, which are
not relevant to this discussion. See § 554(a).
42. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 554.
44- 5 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2000).
45- 5 U.S.C. § 504 (b)(i)(C); see also Lane v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 12o F.3 d io6 (8th Cir. 1997).
46. Section 555 of the APA does impose some requirements on informal agency adjudication, but
these requirements are minimal and not relevant to the issue discussed in this Note.
47. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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meaning," formal rulemaking is not required."' This rule was formulated
in two cases in succeeding terms, both of which involved regulations
addressing chronic shortages of railroad freight cars under the Interstate
Commerce Act (ICA).49 Both cases were also written by then-Justice
Rehnquist: United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.," decided in
1972, and United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.,5 decided in
'973.
Allegheny-Ludlum involved a challenge to the rules promulgated by
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that essentially required
railroads to send empty railroad cars back towards their origin, in order
to prevent freight-car shortages.52 The railroads and shipping companies
bringing the challenge argued that the ICC should have used the formal
rulemaking procedures of §§ 556 and 557 .53 The Court observed that the
language of the ICA54 did not call for a hearing on the record, and found
this to be "determinative for this case.""5 The Court held that "[s]ections
556 and 557 need be applied 'only where the agency statute, in addition




but also stated that "[wle do not suggest that only the precise words 'on
the record' in the applicable statute will suffice."57 Justice Rehnquist
concluded his analysis by noting that "[b]ecause the proceedings under
review were an exercise of legislative rulemaking power rather than
adjudicatory hearings ... and because [the applicable statute] did not
require a determination 'on the record,"' formal rulemaking was not
required.5
The following year, in Florida East Coast Railway, the Court applied
Allegheny-Ludlum to reverse the district court's determination that the
ICA required formal procedures.59 Justice Rehnquist again noted that
"other statutory language having the same meaning could trigger the
provisions of §§ 556 and 557 in rulemaking proceedings." ' However, the
48. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 238 (1973); see also United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 4o6 U.S. 742,757 (1972).
49. 49 U.S.C. § 1(4)(a) (1970) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 11,122 (2000)). The Court refers to
this Act by a different name in each case. In Allegheny-Ludlum, 4o6 U.S. at 744, it is called the Esch
Car Service Act of 1917. In Florida East Coast Railway, 410 U.S. at 238, it is called the Interstate
Commerce Act. For consistency, I will refer to it as the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA).
50. 4o6 U.S. at 742.
51. 410 U.S. at 224.
52. Allegheny-Ludlum, 406 U.S. at 742-43.
53. Id. at 756.
54. 49 U.S.C. § I(4)(a).
55. Allegheny-Ludlum, 4o6 U.S. at 757.
56. Id. (quoting Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 400 F.2d 778, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
57. ld.
58. Id.
59. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224,225-29 (1973).
6o. Id. at 238.
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agency action at issue in Florida East Coast Railway was the
establishment of a schedule of charges for incentive per diem rates,
which effectively charged the railroads daily rates until they returned
empty cars to their origin." The challengers argued that Congress
intended the word hearing in the ICA to require more formalized
procedures, such as oral testimony, cross examination, or oral argument;
in other words, procedures that were required under §§ 556 and 557, but
not under § 553.f In its initial notice of proposed rulemaking, the ICC
stated that the formal rulemaking procedures of the APA applied in this
case, 63 and the government did not contest that argument in the lower
court decision. 64 But the Court disagreed, finding that the hearing given
by the ICC was satisfactory in this case,6 and dismissing the argument
that the ICC's interpretation of whether the APA formal procedures
applied should be given greater weight.66 The Court noted that the ICC's
interpretation of what hearing requirements Congress intended were an
interpretation of the APA, not the ICA, and, therefore, the ICC's
interpretation did not carry the same weight that it would if it were "an
interpretation by an agency ',charged with the responsibility' of
administering a particular statute."6
In effect, the Supreme Court's decisions in Allegheny-Ludlum and
Florida East Coast Railroad create a presumption of informality in
rulemaking proceedings under the APA, with the default requirement
being the notice-and-comment requirements of § 553. Sections 556 and
557 only apply where the explicit language on the record, or similar
statutory language is present.
B. FORMAL OR INFORMAL ADJUDICATION
While the Supreme Court has created a presumption of informality
in rulemaking proceedings, the result is not clear in the context of
adjudication. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue,
68
although several cases have touched on it. This section discusses those
Supreme Court cases, as well as the different approaches taken by lower
courts.
i. The Supreme Court's Comments in Overton Park
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the Supreme
Court commented on when formal APA procedures might be required
61. Id. at 233.
62. Id. at 239-40.
63. Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
64- Id. at 236 n.6.
65. Id. at 243.
66. Id. at 236 n.6.
67. Id. (internal citations omitted).
68. PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 333 (Ioth ed. 2003).
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despite the lack of a statutory requirement that the decision be on the
record. 69 The action at issue in Overton Park was the authorization of
federal funding for construction of a highway through a public park.70
The relevant statute provided that the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation should not authorize funding for projects that would
affect public parks, unless there were no "feasible and prudent"
alternatives.' After finding that this agency action was not rulemaking,
nor a formal adjudication, the Court addressed whether the Secretary
failed to meet any procedural requirements in authorizing the funding."
The Court stated:
[T]he Administrative Procedure Act requirements that there be formal
findings in certain rulemaking and adjudicatory proceedings do not
apply to the Secretary's action here. And, although formal findings
may be required in some cases in the absence of statutory directives
when the nature of the agency action is ambiguous, those situations are
rare.
73
Although neither the relevant statute nor the APA required any
findings or record to be made in this case, the Court determined that
adequate judicial review of the Secretary's decision, which was under the
arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion standard,74 depended upon
that judicial review being "based on the full administrative record that
was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision."" The
Overton Park decision effectively requires that any agency decision
subject to judicial review be made with an adequately developed record,
despite the lack of any statutory or APA requirement of such.76 But the
language used by the Court strongly suggests that situations where this
record requirement triggers the on the record language of the APA
would be "rare. '7  An agency could be required to develop a record for
an adjudication, but that should not trigger formal adjudication.
2. Majority Approach-De Novo Analysis of Congressional Intent
Between 1977 and 1978, three circuit courts75 addressed the issue of
whether the language "opportunity for public hearing" in § 402 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),79 required formal
69. 401 U.S. 402,417 (i97i).
70. Id. at 406-07.
71. Id. at 405 (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964)).
72. Id. at 414-15,417.
73. Id. at 417 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 416 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7 o6(2)(A) (Supp. V 1964)).
75. Id. at 420 (footnote omitted).
76. This is the holding from Overton Park that is most frequently cited.
77. Id. at 420.
78. Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (ist Cir. 1978); Marathon Oil Co. v.
EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. 1977).
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adjudication. Section 402 governs the issuance of National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, and allows issuance of
a permit after an application and an opportunity for public hearing."'
NPDES permits are required before discharging pollutants into
waterways, and through the permitting process, the EPA could impose
limits and conditions on the discharges."' All three circuit courts came to
the same result, finding that the "opportunity for a public hearing"
language triggered the formal APA procedures, despite the lack of "on
the record" language in § 402. But each court had slightly different
reasoning, and the latter two courts commented on the reasoning used in
the preceding cases.
a. Seventh Circuit: U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train
The Seventh Circuit was the first to address this, in U.S. Steel Corp.
v. Train.8' The EPA argued that the APA did not apply to this hearing,
and that the only procedural constraint was the due process clause.8' The
court held, however, that the formal adjudication procedures of the APA
did apply, focusing its reasoning on the requirement of judicial review
under the FWPCA. 4 Under § 509 of the FWPCA, specified sections of
the Act are subject to judicial review." However, only one of those
sections contained the words "on the record." 86 The court noted that
"[tlhe absence of the words 'on the record' [was] not conclusive '"7 and
that the presence of those words in one portion of the statute, but not in
the remainder, was outweighed by other factors.88 "It seems improbable
that Congress would have contemplated that judicial review of
proceedings under all the other sections ... would be conducted without
a written record."' In essence, the court decided that the statute made
more sense by reading an "on the record" requirement into the hearings.
b. Ninth Circuit: Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA
Six months after Train, the Ninth Circuit decided Marathon Oil Co.
v. EPA,'" addressing the same issue. The Marathon Oil court agreed that
the formal APA provisions applied, but disagreed with the Seventh
8o. Id.
81. See Train, 556 F.2d at 829-30.
82. Id. at 822. The Seventh Circuit noted that a prior Seventh Circuit case had "assumed, without
deciding, that the APA applies" to § 402 proceedings. Id. at 833 n.9. (citing Porter County Chapter of
the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Train, 548 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir. 1977)).







90. 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Circuit's reasoning.' Rather than resting on the requirement of judicial
review, the Ninth Circuit's reasons for finding that the formal procedures
of the APA applied rested on the fundamental similarity between
administrative adjudications and judicial decisions, and on the legislative
intent behind the APA." "Congress recognized that certain
administrative decisions closely resemble judicial determinations and, in
the interest of fairness, require similar procedural protections."' Quoting
extensively from the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act,' the Ninth Circuit contrasted these quasi-judicial
proceedings with rulemaking. Rulemaking is more legislative in
character and focused on policy considerations, and should therefore be
"guided by more informal procedures."'95 Adjudications are quasi-judicial
proceedings that "determine the specific rights of individuals" and turn
on "sharply disputed" facts. 6 Therefore, more formal, trial-like
procedures such as cross-examination are needed, and § 554, with its
additional procedural requirements, should apply to the adjudication.
Turning to the specific contention that § 402 lacked the required "on
the record" language, the Ninth Circuit identified two rationales for
finding that § 554 applied here. First, the Attorney General's Manual
suggested that a provision for judicial review could "clearly impl[y]" that
formal "on the record" proceedings were required.9 While the Attorney
General's Manual was issued shortly after the passing of the APA, and
reflects an understanding of the legislative intent behind the APA, this
view is in conflict with the Supreme Court's language in Overton Park."
There, the Court stated that while judicial review may require that a
decision be justified by an adequate record, that record requirement
should only rarely trigger the APA's formal procedures.'
Second, the Ninth Circuit looked at the congressional intent behind
the on the record requirement and the overall structure of how the APA
governed agency action. The court found Congress intended this
language to limit the application of §§ 554, 556 and 557 "to those types of
adjudications. .. needing special procedural safeguards."'" While the
91. Id. at 126o-6i n.25.
92. See id. at 1261.
93. Id.
94. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT (1947). The Department of Justice participated in the drafting of the APA, and the Manual was
published shortly after passage of the APA. It is widely viewed as offering guidance on the legislative
intent underlying the APA.
95. Marathon Oil, 564 F.2d at 1261 (citing Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239
U.S. 441 (1915)).
96. Id. at 1261.
97. Id. at 1263 (quoting ArrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 94, at 40.
98. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
Ioo. Marathon Oil, 564 F.2d at 1263.
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APA defines adjudication as any final disposition that is not a
rulemaking,'0 ' Congress could not have intended for all non-rulemaking
action to fall under the procedural requirements of the APA. Instead,
the Ninth Circuit found that "Congress inserted section 554's prefatory
language ... to exclude from the residual definition of adjudication
'governmental functions, such as the administration of loan programs,
which traditionally have never been regarded as adjudicative in nature
and as a rule have never been exercised through other than business
procedures .....
Under the Ninth Circuit's test, where Congress failed to provide a
hearing in a given statute, it suggests that "Congress either did not feel
that it was providing for an adjudication in the traditional sense of the
word or did not intend the APA procedures to apply."" But, if Congress
did provide for a hearing, "similar weight should not typically be
accorded to" the lack of on the record language.' 4 This test creates a
presumption that when Congress required a hearing, it intended for
formal adjudication. The court backed up its logic with language from
the Attorney General's Manual, stating that unless there is congressional
intent to the contrary, "it should be 'assumed that where a statute
specifically provides for administrative adjudication... after opportunity
for an agency hearing, such specific requirement for a hearing ordinarily
implies the further requirement of decision in accordance with evidence
adduced at the hearing."
0 5
Returning to the specific contentions at issue, the Ninth Circuit
noted that "the crucial question is... whether the proceedings under
review fall within that category of quasi-judicial proceedings deserving of
special procedural protections."6 Because the nature of § 402
proceedings involve factual controversies, which "will frequently be
sharply disputed,"" the formal procedures required by §§ 554, 55 6 and
557 would be "helpful ... in guaranteeing both reasoned decision making
and meaningful judicial review."' 8
The approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Marathon Oil looks at
the administrative decision at issue, and evaluates whether that decision
tO'. 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2000) states that "'adjudication' means agency process for the formulation
of an order." Section 551(6) defines an order as "the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether
affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency, in a matter other than
rulemaking but including licensing." Any agency action that involves a final decision other than
rulemaking, therefore, falls within the definition of an adjudication.
102. Marathon Oil, 564 F.2d at 1263 (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 94, at 40).
103. Id.
Io4- Id.
105. Id. at 1263 n.31 (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 94, at 43).
io6. Id. at 1264.




involves factual questions that will be disputed or broader policy
decisions. If the decision involves the former, then it is the type of
proceeding that Congress intended the APA to apply to, and formal
procedures are required. However, the Ninth Circuit's approach
conflates the distinction between formal and informal with the
distinction between adjudication and rulemaking. The focus of the Ninth
Circuit's approach is on whether the action is more like a judicial
proceeding or more like legislation, and it appears to use that result to
determine whether formal or informal procedures are required. Under
this approach, so long as a statute calls for a hearing where there will be
disputed facts, formal adjudication is required. This leaves little room for
a hearing that does not trigger the formal procedures of the APA.
c. First Circuit: Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle
The First Circuit took the Ninth Circuit's presumption of formality
even further in Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle.'° But while the
Seacoast court found the provision for judicial review to be significant, it
noted that it was "clear that in some cases review of agency action can be
had though the action was not on the record ..... This statement is in
accord with the Supreme Court's language from Overton Park,"' but the
Seacoast court's holding is not.
The First Circuit began its own analysis by looking at "the nature of
the decision at issue .... The court described § 402 proceedings as
requiring "specific factual findings," and only affecting "the rights of the
specific applicant."".3 The court quoted language from Marathon Oil
addressing how these proceedings were adjudicative in nature rather
than legislative."4 "This is exactly the kind of quasi-judicial proceeding
for which the adjudicatory procedures of the APA were intended. '"5 The
First Circuit went on to follow logic very similar to that used by the Ninth
Circuit, including numerous references to the Attorney General's
Manual." 6 The court noted the difficulty of judicial review if the decision
were not made on the record,"7 and evaluated the purpose behind the
prefatory language of § 554.
Without some kind of limiting language, the broad sweep of the
definition of "adjudication,"... would include such ordinary
procedures that do not require any kind of hearing at all. In short, we
view the crucial part of the limiting language to be the requirement of
109. 572 F.2d 872 (ist Cir. 1978).
iio. Id.
iii. See supra note 73.




116. See id. at 877 & n.7, 878.
117. Id. at 877.
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a statutorily imposed hearing. We are willing to presume that, unless a
statute otherwise specifies, an adjudicatory hearing subject to judicial
review must be on the record.
Supporting this presumption, the court cited the legislative history of
the APA,"9 as well as Overton Park for the proposition that a hearing
can require production of a record. 2 Finding that the statute did "not
indicate that the determination need not be on the record," and that
there was no congressional intent to the contrary, the First Circuit held
that §§ 554, 556, and 557 of the APA applied to § 402 proceedings.' 2'
In I98O, the Supreme Court cited Seacoast approvingly, albeit in a
footnote. In Steadman v. SEC,22  the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) brought disciplinary proceedings to permanently bar
the manager of several mutual funds from certain securities-related
activities.'23 These proceedings were an agency adjudication. The
manager challenged the standard of proof used by the SEC in the
administrative proceeding, arguing that it should have been a "clear and
convincing" standard rather than a "preponderance of evidence"
standard.'24 Because the applicable statutes did not prescribe the
standard of proof, the Court looked to § 556 of the APA, and
determined that preponderance of the evidence was the correct
standard.'25
But the SEC had brought proceedings against the manager under
two statutes, one of which required hearing on the record while the other
did not. It was arguable that § 556 of the APA did not apply to the claim
based on the latter statute, because formal adjudication was not
triggered. The Court stated that "the absence of the specific phrase from
[the latter statute] does not make the instant proceeding not subject to
§ 554," and cited Florida East Coast Railway, Allegheny-Ludlum, and
Seacoast. " 6 The Court found that the on the record requirement could be
"satisfied by the substantive content of the adjudication," such as where
the agency decision is judicially reviewed for substantial evidence, and
cited Overton Park and Seacoast Anti-Pollution League.'7 The Court also
iIs. Id. (emphasis added).
ii9. Id. at 877 n.7, 877-78.
12o. Id. at 877 n.8.
121. Id. at 878 (emphasis in original).
122. 450 U.S. 91 (i981).
123. Id. at 94.
124. Id. at 95.
125. Id. at 96.
126. Id. at 96 n.13.
127. Id. The relevant text of the footnote reads:
The phrase "on the record" appears in [15 U.S.C.] § 8ob-3(f), and while it does not appear
in § 8oa-9(b), the absence of the specific phrase from § 8oa-9(b) does not make the instant
proceeding not subject to § 554. Rather, the "on the record" requirement for § 8oa-9(b) is
satisfied by the substantive content of the adjudication. Title 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-42 provides for
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noted that the violations required to be proven under both statutes were
"virtually identical," and that these were "precisely the type of
proceeding for which the APA's adjudicatory procedures were
intended.
, ,I28
d. Trends in the Majority Approach after Seacoast
The Supreme Court's limited approval of the Seacoast approach
represents something of a high-water mark in terms of reading the on the
record requirement into a statute. Later courts addressing this issue have
generally adopted an approach that performs a de novo analysis of
congressional intent, without any presumption of formality. Some
commentators have characterized these later decisions as a second
distinct line of cases.' 9
An example of this approach is shown by City of West Chicago v.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,'30 where the Seventh Circuit re-
addressed the issue of whether a hearing requirement alone might trigger
formal adjudication, but in the context of the Atomic Energy Act
(AEA). The AEA calls for a hearing in certain licensing proceedings,
and the plaintiffs argued that this hearing requirement triggered § 554
and the APA's formal adjudication. 3' The Seventh Circuit distinguished
Train,'32 and acknowledged the decisions in Seacoast and Marathon Oil,'33
but adopted a somewhat more restrictive approach than that taken by
the Seacoast court. Instead of applying a presumption of formality, the
court found that "in the absence of these magic words, Congress must
clearly indicate its intent to trigger the formal, on-the-record hearing
provisions of the APA."'I  The West Chicago court analyzed the
legislative history of the AEA, and found that it did not support finding
that formal hearings were required. Because the AEA's legislative
history did not define what was intended by a hearing,'35 the court
concluded that "there is no evidence that Congress intended to require
judicial review of Commission orders issued pursuant to § 8oa-9(b). Substantial-evidence
review by the Court of Appeals here required a hearing on the record. Otherwise effective
review by the Court of Appeals would have been frustrated.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
128. Id.
129. Cooley R. Howarth, Restoring the Applicability of the APA's Adjudicatory Procedures, 56
Admin. L. Rev. 1043 (2004); Randolph J. May, Recommendations to Amend the APA -Adjudication,
2005 A.B.A. SEC. ADMIN. L. & REG. PRAC. 12 n.53, available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/
apa/x 14report.doc.
130. 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983).
131. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1976) (stating that "the Commission shall
grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding").
132. W. Chicago, 701 F.2d at 644.
133. Id. at 643. The Seventh Circuit noted that both Marathon Oil and Seacoast had rejected the
Train court's analysis of § 558 and agreed that those courts were correct.
134. Id. at 641.
135. Id. at 642-43.
[Vol. 56:IO67
MAGIC WORDS OF § 554
formal hearings."'3
6
3. The D.C. Circuit's Approach - Chevron Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Whether Formal Adjudication is Required
Early cases from the D.C. Circuit applied an approach fairly similar
to that taken by the Seventh Circuit in West Chicago, although it is
possible to read these opinions as requiring a higher showing of
congressional intent to trigger formal adjudication.37 But in Union of
Concerned Scientists v. U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the D.C.
Circuit appeared to adopt the Seacoast presumption-of-formality
approach. 3" In addressing whether a hearing requirement triggered
formal adjudication, the court provided several reasons why formal APA
procedures should apply, although it analyzed them all in a footnote.'39
First, the court cited Seacoast, and stated that "when a statute calls
for a hearing in an adjudication the hearing is presumptively governed by
'on the record' procedures.' 4. Additionally, the Atomic Energy
Commission had applied formal procedures for many years to these
hearings, and had requested that Congress excuse the agency from the
formal procedures, which was not done.'4' Other legislative history
suggested that Congress assumed that the hearings were to be held on
the record.'42 The court found it clear, at least in this case, that formal
procedures were required.43
But five years later, in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA,'
the D.C. Circuit "declined to adhere any longer to the presumption [of
formality] raised in" Union of Concerned Scientists.'45 The court noted
that the statement was dicta, and that there were ample other reasons to
find formal procedures were required in that case. But most importantly,
Union of Concerned Scientists, as well as Seacoast and Marathon Oil, "all
predate the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron.'' 1 6 In Chevron,'47 the
Supreme Court created a two-part test for analyzing when courts should
136. Id. at 645.
137. Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1981); U.S. Lines,
Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
138. 735 F.2d 1437, 1444-45 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.; see also id. at 1446-47.
142. Id. at 1446-47.
143. Id. at 1445 n.12.
144. 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
145. Id. at 1481. As an unusual means of overruling the prior decision without holding an en banc
session, the Chemical Waste Management panel separately circulated the portion of the opinion
rejecting the Union of Concerned Scientists presumption to the entire circuit, receiving approval to
overrule that portion of the decision. Id. at 1482 n.*. Also interestingly, Judge Wald, the author of the
Union of Concerned Scientists opinion, was on the panel in Chemical Waste Management.
146. Id. at 1482.
147. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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defer to agency interpretations of statutes that the agency administers. If
a statute is ambiguous, such that the congressional intent is unclear, and
if the agency's interpretation of that ambiguous statute is permissible, the
agency's interpretation should be given deference by courts'
48
Applying Chevron, the D.C. Circuit evaluated the language and
requirements of the sections of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) that were at issue in this case. 9 There were two provisions
of RCRA that the court discussed. The first was § 6928(b), which
required a "public hearing," if requested, prior to assessment of civil
penalties.'50 With regard to this hearing, the EPA had adopted
procedural regulations'5' that conformed to the formal adjudication
requirements of the APA.52 The second provision, § 6928(h), required a
hearing, if requested, prior to issuance of "an order requiring corrective
action.""'5 Corrective action orders could be issued in response to
releases of hazardous waste, and required corrective action to be taken
by the parties identified in the order. These orders could "include
suspension or revocation of the facility's authorization to operate as an
interim facility."'54 For these hearings, the EPA adopted procedural
regulations that only required formal adjudication procedures if the
proposed order includes suspension or revocation of authorization or
civil penalties. Otherwise, a set of informal procedures would apply.'55
First, the D.C. Circuit noted that "the statutory language, taken
alone, does not show that Congress 'has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. ' ' .. 6 Because the language was silent or ambiguous, the
first part of the Chevron test was satisfied, and the court went on to
evaluate the agency's interpretation for reasonableness. The EPA
justified the difference in procedural requirements between the two
types of hearings on the grounds that the factual issues that would arise
in a corrective action order hearing were "technical" issues. These
technical issues had "little need" for witness credibility determinations,
and could "easily ... be resolved through analysis of the administrative
record and the written submissions and oral statements of the parties. '
Finding the petitioner's arguments to the contrary unpersuasive, the
148. Id. at 842-43.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) (1988).
150. § 6928(b).
151. Procedural regulations are exempted from the informal rulemaking procedural requirements
of the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 3(b)(A) (2ooo).
152. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1479 (D.C. Cir. z989).
153. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 69 28(h)).
154. Id. at 1479.
155. These informal procedures had also been adopted by the EPA through procedural
rulemaking. Id.
i56. Id. at i48o.
157. Id. at 1482.
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court upheld the EPA's interpretation of the hearing requirements of the
statute.
While an agency might not be able reasonably to read a requirement
that it conduct a "hearing on the record" to permit informal
procedures in the converse situation to that presented here, an agency
that reasonably reads a simple requirement that it hold a "hearing" to
allow for informal hearing procedures must prevail under the second
step of Chevron.'
While few courts have expressly mentioned the reasoning of
Chemical Waste Management, the application of Chevron deference to
agency determinations of law has been widely followed, leading to many
cases finding that no formal hearing is required.'59 However, the Seacoast
and Marathon Oil approaches, which read a presumption of formality
into the analysis, have never been explicitly overruled.
4. ABA Proposal to Amend the APA 's Adjudication Provisions
The American Bar Association (ABA) has weighed in on this split
in authority over when formal adjudication applies. In 2000, at the behest
of the ABA's Judicial Division, the ABA House of Delegates adopted
Resolution 113, which included two specific proposals.' 6° First, the
Resolution proposed that in enacting new legislation, Congress should
explicitly consider whether formal or informal adjudication was required.
Second, for new legislation that does not include an explicit intent for
formal or informal adjudication, the APA's default presumption should
be in favor of formal adjudication. This second aspect of the Resolution,
which adopts the Seacoast presumption of formality approach, has been
advanced as restoring the original intent of the APA, and has also been
criticized as being needlessly doctrinal, and hindering agency flexibility.'
6
,
The ABA's Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice
continues to advocate these changes. 62 In February 2005, the Section
submitted a revised proposal to the ABA House of Delegates, which was
approved.' 63 This revised proposal included the changes advocated in the
2000 Resolution, and also addressed informal adjudication. As discussed
158. Id.
159. See I RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.2 (4 th ed. 2002) (citing cases
in which courts have found that formal procedures are not required).
I6o. See Gary J. Edles, An APA-Default Presumption for Administrative Hearings: Some Thoughts
on "Ossifying" the Adjudication Process, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 787, 788 (20O3).
I6I. See id. (criticizing the proposal as being overly doctrinal and formalistic, and hindering agency
flexibility); Howarth, supra note 129 (advocating the proposal as restoring the original intent of the
APA).
62. Randolph J. May, Recommendations to Amend the APA -Adjudication, 2005 A.B.A. SEC.
ADMIN. L. & REG. PRAC. 12 n.53, available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/i I4report.doc.
63. See Daily Journal, ABA House of Delegates, 2005 Midyear Meeting (Feb. 14, 20o5) (Report
No. 114), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2oo5/midyear/daily/oumal.doc.
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above,' 64 where formal adjudication is not required, the APA imposes no
procedural requirements on an agency adjudication. This current
proposal calls for certain procedural protections to also apply to informal
adjudication, such as an impartial decisionmaker, a prohibition on ex
parte contacts, and a written or oral decision of findings, which is
currently only required for formal adjudication.
Commentators discussing these proposals, or the circuit split over
when formal adjudication applies, generally advocate one of the
approaches discussed above.' 6' These commentators have noted that the
Supreme Court has not yet "found it necessary to resolve the issue."
'66
While the Court has not yet explicitly resolved this issue, this Note
argues that the Court's decision in Mead, where the Court clarified the
limits of Chevron deference, is controlling, and creates a new approach
different from the ones above.
C. DEFERENCE TO AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS UNDER MEAD
The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron created a doctrine that
has become "as ubiquitous as if Congress had written it into the APA."''
1
The application of Chevron deference to agency determinations has
expanded throughout the years following the decision, leading to its wide
application in almost all substantive areas of law where agencies played a
role. 68 However, in recent years the Court began clarifying and limiting
when Chevron deference is applicable. In Chevron's Domain, published
shortly before the Mead decision,'69 Professor Thomas Merrill and Kristin
Hickman explored a series of the Court's decisions, and analyzed the
various explanations of the jurisprudential basis for Chevron deference.
In their article, the authors identified a series of unanswered questions
about Chevron, and attempted to answer these questions through an
analysis of the legal foundation for the Chevron doctrine.'70 The authors
concluded that Chevron deference could be supported by an implied
delegation of power by Congress to the agencies, but only "when [the
agencies] act with the force of law in promulgating rules or adjudicating a
dispute that falls within their legislative mandate, and not otherwise.''
z64. Supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
165. Edles, supra note 16o, at 804 (suggesting that courts should look to statutory language,
legislative history, and regulatory context, without any presumption of formality, and without any
deference to the agency in evaluating whether formal adjudication is required); Howarth, supra note
129 (advocating a presumption of formality approach).
166. Edles, supra note t6o, at 804; see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS 43 n.7 (3d ed. 1997).
167. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,839 (200).
I68. See id.
169. See generally id.
170. Id. at 849-52.
171. Id. at 921.
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Applying this reasoning to the Chemical Waste Management decision, the
authors disagreed that the EPA was entitled to Chevron deference, as
the agency was not "entitled to Chevron deference with respect to the
separate and distinct issue whether such a hearing falls within the
definition of a hearing on the record within the meaning of the APA.
EPA has not been delegated any authority to interpret the APA with
binding authority.. 7
Shortly after Merrill and Hickman's article, the Supreme Court
decided United States v. Mead Corp, and cited their article.'73 The Court
stated that it "granted certiorari, in order to consider the limits of
Chevron deference owed to administrative practice in applying a
statute."'74 The Court held that:
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision
qualifies for Chevron deference when it appear that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Delegation of such
authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power
to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by
some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.7
The Court noted that the statutory authority for rulemaking or
formal adjudication, and the procedures required by the applicable APA
provisions, would "foster the fairness and deliberation that should
underlie a pronouncement of such force."'' 6 As such, it made sense that
most cases where Chevron was applied dealt with rules promulgated
under § 553, or formal adjudication under § 554 .I77 These situations were
ones where it was clear that Congress delegated authority to the agency
to interpret the statute with the force of law.'
However, where Congress did not delegate the authority to act with
the force of law, an agency may still receive some deference to its
interpretation, known as Skidmore deference. 79 In Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., the Supreme Court found that even when an agency was not
authorized to speak with force of law, its "rulings, interpretations and
172. Id. at 896.
173. 533 U.S. 218 (2ooi). Chevron's Domain was published in May 2001 and Mead was decided on
June 8, 2001.
174. Id. at 226.
175. Id. at 226-27.
176. Id. at 230 (citing Merrill & Hickman, supra note 167).
177. See id. The Court consistently refers to notice-and-comment rulemaking as deserving of
deference, but does not mention formal rulemaking, which presumably would be an even stronger
candidate for Chevron deference.
178. But the Court also recognized that Chevron deference could be called for where such formal
procedures were not required, citing a case where the Comptroller of the Currency was given special
deference under longstanding precedent. Id. at 231 & n.t3.
179. Id. at 234 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)).
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opinions.., constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' ' The
amount of deference given to the agency's interpretation under
Skidmore depends "upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control."'' The Mead Court noted some additional
factors that have been considered when evaluating Skidmore deference.
"[C]ourts have looked to the degree of the agency's care, its consistency,
formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the
agency's position.""" The more careful, consistent, and formal the
agency's interpretation, and the more expertise that the agency has in the
matter, the more deference that should be given to the agency's
interpretation.
II. DEFERENCE TO AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF
WHETHER FORMAL ADJUDICATION iS REQUIRED
A. WHAT DEGREE OF DEFERENCE IS DUE?
When a statute calls for an agency to grant a hearing, did Congress
delegate authority to the agency to speak with the force of law as to
whether that hearing is formal or informal under the APA? There are
two ways that this question can be presented. First, the question can be
presented as whether Congress delegated authority to interpret the term
hearing in the particular statute. The answer to this question may depend
on the particular statute at issue. Congress may have authorized the
agency to issue procedural regulations governing such a hearing, or there
may be clear legislative intent to let the agency define the scope of that
hearing. In that case, it is probable that Congress did intend to delegate
authority to speak with the force of law as to what procedures were
required by that hearing.
However, this presentation of the question is inaccurate. The
question is not whether Congress delegated the authority to interpret the
particular statute, but whether Congress delegated the authority to
interpret the APA. The issue of whether or not formal adjudication is
required for a particular adjudication is an interpretation of the APA,
not the statute authorizing the hearing. It is not a question of whether, by
hearing, Congress meant formal adjudication, but instead whether
Congress, by "decision on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing," meant for § 554 to still apply when the statute says something





less than those magic words.'8' The answer to this question is no, because
Congress has not delegated the authority to any agency to interpret the
APA with the force of law.
The goals and purposes of the APA show that Congress did not
delegate that power to any agency. "One purpose [of the APA] was to
introduce greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of
administrative practice among" federal agencies.' Since Congress
required every agency to apply similar procedures in administrative
adjudications, it certainly did not delegate the decision making authority
to any given agency to determine whether the APA applies.
What about where a statute calls for the agency to promulgate
procedures to be used for hearings? In that situation, the language of
§ 559 of the APA indicates that any such procedures are in addition to,
and not instead of, the APA requirements. 5 That section states that the
administrative procedure requirements of the APA "do not limit or
repeal additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise
recognized by law," and that subsequent statutes "may not be held to
supersede or modify" the APA requirements, unless the later statute
"does so expressly."' 86 Any procedural regulations adopted by an agency
are only supplementary to the APA, and do not eliminate the APA's
underlying procedural requirements.
And the Supreme Court has commented, albeit prior to Chevron,
that the APA is not a statute that any particular agency has the authority
to interpret. In Florida East Coast Railway, 8, Justice Rehnquist wrote
that
[the APAI is not legislation that the Interstate Commerce Commission,
or any other single agency, has primary responsibility for
administering. An agency interpretation involving, at least in part, the
provisions of [the APA] does not carry the weight, in ascertaining the
intent of Congress, that an interpretation by an agency "charged with
the responsibility" of administering a particular statute does.'
88
Because Congress did not delegate the authority to any agency to
interpret the APA, Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of
183. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 167, at 896 (reviewing the Chemical Waste Management
decision and stating that there the EPA was not "entitled to Chevron deference with respect to the
separate and distinct issue whether such a hearing [in the statute] falls within the definition of a
hearing on the record within the meaning of the APA"). But see Howarth, supra note 129, at 1053
(stating that where something in the agency's authorizing statute indicates that formal procedures are
not required, "the court is no longer interpreting the APA but the agency's organic statute and, with
respect to irresolvable ambiguities in that statute, Chevron deference is surely due").
184. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 4 (1950).
185. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2oo0).
186. Id.
187. Discussed supra text accompanying notes 59-67.
188. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 236 n.6 (I973).
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whether formal adjudication is required is not appropriate.
However, as discussed above, where Chevron deference is not
appropriate, the agency's interpretation "may influence courts facing
questions the agencies have already answered."' ' This is Skidmore
deference, and the level of influence given to the agency's interpretation
is determined using the Skidmore factors.'" These factors include the
level of care exercised by the agency in making that interpretation, the
"consistency, formality, and relative expertness" of the interpretation,
and the overall persuasiveness of the agency's position. 9 ' As the Court in
Skidmore wrote, such factors comprise "all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control."92
Therefore, the appropriate test for whether or not formal
adjudication is required when a statute calls for a hearing is to first
evaluate the agency's interpretation of that hearing requirement using
the Skidmore factors. Depending on how reasoned, careful, and formal
that interpretation, the court should afford it the level of deference that
is appropriate. If that interpretation does not warrant Skidmore
deference, then the court should engage in an independent, de novo
analysis of the congressional intent of the statute. If the court finds that
Congress intended for the statutory hearing to be a formal adjudication,
then formal adjudication should be required.
B. APPLICATION OF SKIDMORE DEFERENCE
To illustrate the application of Skidmore deference to agency
interpretations of whether formal adjudication is required, this approach
is applied to two cases from the D.C. Circuit, both of which were
discussed above. The analyses used in these two cases, Union of
Concerned Scientists and Chemical Waste Management, reflect the two
existing approaches discussed in this article. In Union of Concerned
Scientists, the D.C. Circuit cited the Seacoast decision, and engaged in a
de novo analysis of congressional intent, with a presumption of formality,
and found that formal procedures were required, despite the agency's
argument otherwise. But in Chemical Waste Management, the D.C.
Circuit rejected that approach in order to give the agency Chevron
deference, and upheld the agency's interpretation that formal
adjudication was not required. The application of Skidmore deference to
these two cases reaches the same results, but based on facts showing the
level of care, reasoning, and formality of the agency's interpretation in
each case.
189. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
19o. Id. at 228.
191. Id.




First is Union of Concerned Scientists. In this case, prior to Chemical
Waste Management, the D.C. Circuit rejected the agency's interpretation
that formal adjudication was not required, and suggested that there is a
presumption of formality for adjudications. The agency's interpretation
of the statute at issue in this case provides an excellent example of a
situation where that interpretation should not be given substantial
deference under Skidmore.
In Union of Concerned Scientists, a citizen's group challenged the
licensing of a nuclear power plant. The principal issue contested was
whether an assessment of "emergency preparedness exercises" must be
considered at the licensing hearing. The agency, after years of including
such an assessment in licensing hearings, took procedural steps to
remove the consideration of those exercises from the public hearing.'93
The agency issued new procedural regulations defining what issues
would be considered at the public formal hearings, and which ones would
be considered by the agency without a formal hearing. The agency's
interpretation of the statute was that even though the assessment of the
emergency exercises was material to the licensing, the agency had
discretion to evaluate such issues without a formal hearing.'
Looking to the Skidmore factor of consistency, the agency's new
interpretation was inconsistent with its prior interpretations. The
elimination of consideration of emergency exercises from a formal
hearing was inconsistent with prior agency procedure, as well as the
ample legislative history on the topic of what kind of hearing Congress
intended. The agency's interpretation was also inconsistent with regards
to other portions of the statute and regulation. The D.C. Circuit noted
that the language used in the amended procedural rules conflicted with,
or was at least "odd" with respect to, other portions of the regulations
and part of the agency's position taken before the court."
Regarding expertise, another Skidmore factor, one of the agency
commissioners had dissented from the amended procedural rules on the
grounds that the public had greater expertise than the agency in regards
to this issue. The commissioner stated that emergency preparedness
plans are an area that "happens to be one in which the nuclear plant's
neighbors have special competence, greater in some respects than that
of" the agency.' 6 Eliminating the consideration of emergency
preparedness from the public hearings would reduce the overall
expertise brought to bear on the decision of licensing.
193. Union of Concerned Scientists v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 735 F.2d 1437, 1440
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
194. Id. at 1446.
195. Id. at z44o-4i.
196. Id. at 1441 n.6.
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Because the agency's interpretation was inconsistent with its prior
interpretations, other regulations, and clear legislative history, and
because the agency had significantly less expertise on this issue than the
public, the court was correct to be skeptical of the agency's
interpretation. The court should not have given the agency much
deference under Skidmore, and was correct to perform a de novo review
of the hearing requirements under that statute.
In contrast is the Chemical Waste Management decision, which
provides an example of a situation where the agency's interpretation
should receive deference under Skidmore.'97 As described above,' 98 this
was the case where the D.C. Circuit first applied Chevron deference to
the EPA's interpretation of whether formal adjudication was required.
Looking at the Skidmore factors in Chemical Waste Management, the
agency should have received substantial deference under Skidmore. The
EPA had promulgated procedural regulations, which interpreted the
hearing requirement in two portions of a statute. The interpretations
were different, in that one hearing received formal adjudication, and the
other did not. However, the different interpretations were designed to
give different levels of formality depending upon the potential
deprivation at issue in the hearing. When the agency sought civil
penalties or the revocation or suspension of authorization to operate,
greater deprivations were at issue. In these situations, formal procedures
were required, which conformed to the requirements of formal
adjudication under the APA. '  Informal procedures were only
permissible when the agency was seeking a corrective action order, and
even those allowed significant trial-like procedures."°
This two-tiered approach indicated that the agency put some
thought and care into its interpretation of hearing under the statute.
These procedural regulations, although exempted from notice-and-
comment rulemaking, do indicate that the agency was being consistent in
its application of this interpretation. The EPA's expertise in these
hearings is evidenced by the arguments made before the court. The EPA
noted that typical hearings for corrective action orders would have far
fewer factual issues than an order seeking penalties, and the factual
issues that would arise would be highly technical and not particularly
conducive to oral presentation and cross-examination."0 ' The agency's
knowledge and expertise in dealing with the types of issues that arise
during such hearings lends support for deferring to its interpretation. In
197. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
198. Supra text accompanying notes 144-58.
199. Chem. Waste Mgmt., 873 F.2d at 1479.
200. Id. The EPA informal procedures allowed for an oral presentation, an impartial adjudicator,
and the opportunity to submit information for inclusion in the record. Id.
201. Id.
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light of these factors, the EPA's position in Chemical Waste Management
is persuasive, and would likely be upheld by a court giving the agency
Skidmore deference. However, as this discussion has shown, that result is
supported by the circumstances of that case, and the same result may not
be correct in other situations.
CONCLUSION
The APA's formal adjudication procedures give parties to an agency
adjudication significant trial-like opportunities, through which they can
present evidence, challenge opposing arguments, and appear in front of
an impartial decisionmaker. However, the APA's language states these
protection apply only if Congress has required a hearing on the record.
Where Congress has only required a hearing, two tests have been
developed to determine whether formal adjudication may still apply. The
majority of circuits perform a de novo analysis of congressional intent,
sometimes with a presumption in favor of formal procedures. The D.C.
Circuit applies Chevron deference, and if the statutory language is
ambiguous, the agency's interpretation, if reasonable, is given deference.
The Supreme Court's decision in Mead limits the application of
Chevron deference. While this will require a re-evaluation of many
decisions in which Chevron deference was given to agency
interpretations, in this particular context, Mead creates a new test to
apply when evaluating whether a hearing requires formal adjudication. If
a statute calls for a hearing, without an on the record requirement, a
court should evaluate the agency's interpretation under Skidmore. If the
agency's reasoning, consistency, expertise, and overall persuasiveness
indicates that Skidmore deference is appropriate, then the court should
defer to the agency interpretation. If not, only then should the court
engage in a de novo analysis of congressional intent. This test is neither
as deferential as the D.C. Circuit's approach, nor as independent as the
majority de novo approach, but instead, treads the middle ground
established by the Supreme Court in Mead.
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